[OC-investment] Integrator Growth Grants

[clJoseph]

Note: This post should be treated as a first draft. Some details may change based on feedback gathered during this ideation phase. All community members are invited to share their thoughts and ideas directly in this thread. Dynamic discussions will take place in the community channels, but this forum serves as the main, concentrated venue for feedback on this specific topic.

Overview

This proposal introduces defined thresholds for over-collateralization (OC) fund allocations that gTrade contributors may approve at their discretion for integrator grants — without requiring full $GNS governance votes — to accelerate adoption through third-party integrations.

The aim is to allow contributors to act quickly on time-sensitive growth opportunities while maintaining community oversight, transparency, and multi-sig safeguards.

Under this framework:

• Discretionary OC-pulls up to the approved per-grant threshold that may be approved by gTrade contributors.

• Grants above that threshold — or above a quarterly aggregate cap — would require a separate governance proposal and Snapshot vote.

• All discretionary grants must be communicated to the community on this forum with reasoning, expected outcomes, and post-grant summaries/case studies.

Justification

Why now

• v8 introduced open contracts, creating a foundation for integrator-led network effects. The team has since worked closely with partners to guide them through complete integrations.

• v10 positions the protocol to scale meaningfully, making now the right time to accelerate with partner-led promotional events — such as trading contests, sign-up promotions, and collateral sponsorships.

• Many integrator opportunities are time-sensitive and require deep understanding of said integrations.

  • A streamlined approval process, relying on contributors’ expertise enables faster execution while maintaining transparency and vault health.

Why OC-pulls

• Since v9.4.5, gTrade’s referral system allows industry-competitive revenue sharing with whitelisted referrals — mostly paid in $GNS — aligning partners and their communities with the token. However, even with competitive revenue share in place, some integrators may still require upfront stablecoin grants to support bootstrapping their integration, kickstart go-to-market efforts, or accelerate that phase in a way revenue share alone cannot achieve.

  • And, some useful integrators such as data analytic platforms aren’t compatible with the revenue share model (ie. don’t submit trades directly).

• While a referral refactor later this year will expand flexibility (distributions in GNS, USDC, or a combination) and improve structure, there will continue to be select cases where direct stablecoin grants to integrators are necessary.

• The Perp DEX vertical is highly competitive, and integrators may have multiple options to choose from. Being able to co-sponsor promotional efforts can help tip the scales in gTrade’s favor when courting high-value potential integrators. In some cases, these discussions cannot be made public until a grant is secured or the integration process is initiated — making it important for gTrade contributors to have the discretion to act quickly.

  • In certain scenarios, gTrade may front the grant from the governance fund initially, while pulling OC-funds at a later stage to cover the grant effectively — always accompanied by public reports on the why, when, and how of the decision-making.

Eligibility

Any active and upcoming integrators with strong potential to grow protocol usage, such as:

• Active: Symphony, Social Trade, Copin, Mobile Wallets

• Upcoming: Hawk Trade, Carrot, Rethink, Dexpal, Vooi, and more

It’s important that integrations align with the roadmap vision of gTrade as a core DeFi building block across platforms, wallets, and trading tools.

Examples:

Symphony (Sympson AI)— an AI-powered trading terminal where traders can research, analyze, and execute strategies directly, with trades settled (exclusively) on gTrade’s liquidity.

• Potential grant: co-sponsor a dedicated trading competition, driving volume to gTrade by incentivizing AI-driven trading flows.

Carrot Funding — a fully onchain prop fund, aiming to onboard prop traders to DeFi, exclusively integrated with gTrade for its public launch.

• Potential grant: co-sponsor funded accounts — “Apply for Carrot’s whitelist and get your account funded with an extra $200.”

Dexpal — a data terminal and rewards hub for leverage trading on Perp DEXs, soon to launch publicly.

• Potential grant: sponsor a gTrade-specific trading competition to support their bootstrapping phase and onboard gTrade as an official partner.

Hawk Trade — a Telegram-based trading bot fully integrated with gTrade, featuring copy trading and native signal integrations.

• Potential grant: deposit matches — “Deposit $10, get $10 in in collateral.”

Discretionary grants in such cases could accelerate onboarding and promotional campaigns during public launches, directly driving volume to gTrade.

Decision Framework

When considering a grant, contributors will assess:

• Growth Potential: Expected user acquisition and trading volume.

• Integrator Competence: Development quality, team track record, audit status.

• Protocol Profitability: Reasonable forecast of sustainable volume and fees — without compromising on native volumes.

• Strategic Value: Expansion into new user segments or ecosystems.

• Integration Exclusivity: Extent to which gTrade is featured as a core trading engine.

Impact Analysis

Expected Outcomes

• Higher integrator conversion

• Shorter go-to-market timelines for integrators.

• Higher protocol volume and fee generation.

• More partner-led marketing aligned with gTrade’s growth.

• Stronger network effects via embedded integrations.

Metrics for Success

• Volume and traders generated by funded integrations.

• ROI of grants over 1–3 months post-campaign.

• Number of high-quality integrations onboarded.

Risks and Mitigations

Risk: Misallocation to low-impact initiatives.

• Mitigation: Strict vetting using decision framework, plus post-grant case studies.

Risk: Community concern over favoritism or opacity.

• Mitigation: Public forum posts detailing rationale, timing, and expected impact for each grant.

Risk: OC fund depletion.

• Mitigation: Threshold limits and quarterly caps, with multi-sig control for said grants AND governance oversight for larger grants.

Risk: Misleading signal of integrators’ ability to achieve organic reach and user conversion.

• Mitigation: Require integrators to present a forecast of outcomes (new users, volume, engagement) and the plan for sustaining them post-campaign.

Implementation

• Approval: All discretionary grants require multi-sig approval, including community representatives.

• Reporting: Forum updates for each grant, plus quarterly summary reports.

• Review: Thresholds and caps revisited every 6 months to ensure alignment with protocol growth.

Voting Options

FOR — Approve discretionary OC-pull thresholds for integrator grants, with multi-sig approval and reporting requirements:

• Per grant threshold: Choose from <$5,000, <$10,000, or <20,000 in stablecoins.

• Per quarter threshold: Set an aggregate cap to prevent over-allocation ($30,000 or $50,000).

AGAINST — Maintain the current system, where all integrator grants should require separate governance proposals and Snapshot votes — regardless of size.

A: FOR — < $5,000 per grant

B: FOR — < $10,000 per grant

C: FOR — < $20,000 per grant

D: FOR — <$30,000 per quarter

E: FOR — < $50,000 per quarter

F: AGAINST — Require snapshot for every grant

If approved, this framework allows the team to act quickly on high-value integration opportunities while maintaining community oversight, OC fund safety, and full transparency.

[damada_21]

From Flynn on telegram

”I’m ok with it, well described and thought of, no particular questions it’s clear, for me it seems we have more to win than to loose with it, all within a controlled risk framework. 10k and 50k thresholds respectively.”

[GAINTOZZ]

tks @clJoseph for the great summary!

I think, with v10 working as finely as it does, that trader onboarding should be a main focus. If we can accelerate integrators reacting to market changes/needs faster by having growth grants then this is a good thing.

It will be important to keep track and document the initiatives and review the impact as well as improve the efficiency for future campaigns. The community will appreciate if such initiatives are well reported once the team is able to do so openly.

With the current OC esp. given the bullish market conditions I think that the higher limits of the thresholds are well justified.

[MidgetWhale]

Dear Joseph,

Thank you for the proposal and the detailed write up.
The OC has been established through income generated from GNS being the counterparty of last resort to all trades.
As such, it was always acknowledged as being funds generated for the token holders.

Since inception there have been clearly defined revenue streams.
Part of the fees goes to vault stakers, part goes to the gov fund, part goes to the token holders and OC eventually goes to token holders as well.

Grants, competitions and marketing have always been part of the gov fund’s responsibilities.
I dislike this push of making the OC a piggy bank that can be used for anything at all.
The only reason why I was in favor for the last (and first) time the OC was used for spending outside of token dividends or burns was out of sheer necessity, I really felt that competition and marketing campaign was desperately needed and since governance did not have the funds, OC was simply the only way.

For this I don’t see the same necessity.
On top of this, I see this as simply the second stepping stone on a slippery slope towards endless depletions of the OC for things it was not meant to fund, like grants, competitions, marketing campaigns a.o.

If the team really feels these grants are worthwhile, I’d like to see them funded with the gov fund.
If the team thinks the gov fund needs more money to do so, they should go the way of proposing yet another gov fund raise.

I will vote against this proposal.

Midgetwhale

[Highlander]

Thanks for the proposal and this interesting conversation. I do believe community should discuss it more before going to a vote somehow, i’m still hesitating about my own vote. Let’s see how it goes !

[damada_21]

I can understand midgets (and I assume others) hesitation but it seems like the benefits could outweigh the negatives. As long is there’s a strong vetting and post review process so we can see if it’s bringing in more value than taken.

If it’s not then we stop doing it but it does seem like it would worth exploring at the very least, especially considering the relatively low asks per quarter.

[Michael246]

I agree with Midget. OC should be a last-resort option, since the counterparty is GNs, and therefore should belong to GNS token holders. I understand the need for rapid expansion, but I think I’ll also vote against it.

[clJoseph]

Dear everyone,

Thank you for the thoughtful responses here and in the community chats. We’d like to add context on why this proposal was put forward and address some of the concerns raised, mainly those outlined in @MidgetWhale’s post.

On alignment: GNS remains the largest beneficiary of gTrade’s growth, with most trading fees directed to buybacks and burns, including a dynamic share of negative trader PnL. Using OC funds for select integrator grants does not change that dynamic, especially with the suggested thresholds which are relatively small compared to overall protocol revenue. This framework allows to capture growth opportunities without altering existing revenue distributions or inflating the governance fund’s share.

On the governance fund: This budget has historically been focused on operational costs and remains tight. As it captures 24.5% of fees + 5.65% of buybacks [assuming no referrals’ revenue share], any growth initiative would need ~4.5x ROI to break even which makes most opportunities unviable. OC-backed grants make ecosystem-wide growth possible, benefiting traders, holders, LPs, integrators, arbitrageurs, and the governance fund itself, while keeping current distributions intact.

On counterparty utility: As GNS has been the counterparty of last resort, holders already trust contributors with risk management. This proposal seeks similar trust for growth decisions, with safeguards in place: multi-sig approvals, thresholds per grant or quarter, and transparent reporting. The team has already invested hundreds of hours into integrations funded by the governance fund, and these grants are about activating them (and new ones).

On slippery slope concerns: Safeguards and documentation are central to this proposal to ensure accountability and prevent open-ended commitments. We believe grant outcomes often follow a power law distribution: some will deliver modest or disappointing results, but a some could yield outsized benefits that drive the ecosystem forward. Capturing those requires initial capital and tolerance for experimentation, conditions the governance fund alone cannot provide.

‘Network Effects’ are an important element of our 2025 roadmap and vision and we’d like to bring +EV opportunities to the ecosystem that governance fund-backed ROI requirements would exclude. We respect that not everyone may see it the same way, but we believe this is a sensible and intentional step toward compounding long-term growth for gTrade and GNS.

Please keep the feedback coming as we plan to move this to a Snapshot vote toward the end of this week.

[rentmynft]

A Big thumbs up to midget. Whoever has come up with this idea of liquidating OC does not deserve to be part of the gains team. Please quit. You obviously were not part of the team when Luna crisis happened. Enuf said.

[rentmynft]

Absolute horror show of a proposal, this. Kill the platform, loot the vaults, fly off to Madagascar with the looted money will be the next proposal, going at this rate.

Whoever thought of this brilliant proposal needs to be removed from the team to prevent future contamination.

And this proposal should be made into a diamond NFT. Deserves such accolades, yes. /s

[clJoseph]

Let’s keep the discussions constructive? @rentmynft

I don’t think the thresholds proposed at max. $30k or $50k per quarter (ie. MAX. ~0.8% of the current protocol-owned overcollaterlization layers in August, 2025) warrant comparisons to the LUNA crisis in 2022. Since then, the protocol and risk management practices have changed significantly. Proposing growth initiatives through protocol-owned funds via GNS-approval fits that context in my opinion - - be it ultimately approved by GNS holders or not.

To clarify, there has already been appetite for OC-funded growth initiatives beyond myself. I simply structured this proposal to gather feedback in a transparent and scalable way. I’ve also added more context here, and re-iterated that we respect holders who are against. That is the nature of governance where everyone can ultimately express their stance at Snapshot.

Instead of framing this as grounds for contributors to be removed, I would encourage suggesting alternative ideas for how we can responsibly accelerate gTrade’s growth. If you feel strongly against OC-funded efforts, that’s fair, but let’s use this forum to exchange constructive feedback.

And, regarding your other comment in this thread, it’s essentially an exaggerated version of the “slippery slope” concern already raised by @midgetwhale here, which would be directly addressed with with above-mentioned safeguards.

[thebuidler]

As someone with privileged insight into how the team operates, I’d expect a higher standard in how concerns are raised. Everyone here knows how hard contributors are working to move the project forward.

It’s natural to disagree, but that doesn’t require questioning the integrity or commitment of those putting in the work.

Keep feedback focused on the ideas themselves.

[thebuidler]

A c/p of my tg post:

Gov fund can’t reliably fund growth initiatives on its own unfortunately. It sees ~1/4 of fee share, nothing from pnl revenue. An initiative has to see effectively a 4+:1 ROI to return what the gov spent.

Grant results will be power law distributed. So the majority will not return that, while small subset have outsized returns making up for it. You need 1. initial capital; 2. tolerance for it to work. Gov fund has neither.

The proposal puts safeguards in place / emphasizes accountability through 1. per grant; 2. per quarter limits and quarterly reviews of spend. It’s not intended to mark the beginning of some slipper slope, but rather intentionality / agility around deploying those funds to ultimately benefit gns.

Network effects are a key element in growing, especially while we try and remain lean. We need to focus on compounding and I think this is a sensible lever.

[rentmynft]

Constructive: if we are talking about $50k per quarter, that is $200k per year max, pull that from the token-holder revenue.

We give $6.5m annually to tokens holders through bbb from the fees alone.

And few millions more from PnL share.

It is a tiny % to divert to growth initiatives.

I have repeatedly said - no startup offers dividend before funding growth. We should not.

But I do not support ‘withdrawing money from 401k to host a summer bbq with the intention of growing my professional network’. I’m ok to host that bbq with my salary or bonus or rsu money.

[MidgetWhale]

Thank you for replying clJoseph,

First of all, I am not trying to allege here that the team is looting the vaults as rentmynft says, I think that such rhethoric is not constructive, but I merely want to point out that as an unintended consequence the long term result might be that most of the OC will get depleted this way. I don’t suggest bad intentions, just the give a mouse a cookie effect, it might snowball into wanting to use it for more competitions, more marketing campaigns, more this, more that

It might be important to point out that the PnL has not been a large revenue stream the past 14 months, only 1.05 million in 14 months or 60k per month. Last proposal to take 300k for the competition and marketing campaign essentially takes out 5 months of gains.
This proposal takes out another 10-15k per month, up to a quarter of the income generated.

The size of the current OC right now is mostly the result of savings done by the protocol in the period June 2022-April 2024 and ETH appreciation afterwards. It has been partially depleted to increase the burn rate during a period of low valuation, purchases which were nearly all done at lower prices than today.

I just very much favor having a discussion about the gov fund’s appropriate distribution and then funding these things through the gov fund that way, it’s more sustainable that way as the earnings through fees are less volatile as the PnL earnings.
I also feel it’s more transparent and creates a better oversight if all costs are paid by the same, most reliable source of income.

If we really need to act fast and the team has high conviction about these integrator growth grants, another one clip OC withdrawal (like with the competition / marketing spend) can be proposed, but recurring expenses I am not in favor of at all.

Pertaining to your paragraph on the governance fund and the ROI multiple point of view…
Yes the budget remains tight but it does capture as you say 24.5% + 5.65% (10% of the buybacks) = 30.15% of fees. This would mean only a 3.3x ROI to breakeven (not a 4.5x one as you say).
As for a comparison on this dune https://dune.com/queries/2826649/4780041 you can see that the GMX treasury only receives 8.52% of all protocol fees.
This thus requires them to have a 12x ROI for any grant or competition that they invest in, I guess by that logic, it makes no sense for them to invest in any integrator growth grants. But do they?

By the same logic since only 1.05M was made in PnL during the last 14 month period in which the protocol saw over 15M in fees, a growth initiative needs to be 15x ROI to break even for the OC.
I’m really not sure if this ROI analysis on a subsection of the protocol is the right way to approach this.

Now, looking at GMX, I think it’s clear that the reason why their treasury gets such a low %-age is because they do not benefit of the extremely liquidity efficient architecture we do, precisely because we have the GNS token with the OC buffer as the final counterparty.
Therefore they have to pay their liquidity providers 69% whilst we can afford to pay them only 15%.
This 54% delta comes from having the GNS token as counterparty of last resort.

The real difference comes from their trailing twelve month protocol fees being 76.5 Million and ours just being 11.5 Million.
You can’t expect to be able to outspend a protocol that is literally has 6-7 times your revenue stream, no matter what your internal allocation is.

To circle back on the original proposal and repeat my position.
I prefer to see it funded through the governance fund, which we could debate if it should be raised in allocation, cognisant of the fact that we already allocate 3.5x as much of the revenue to the gov fund as our closest competitor.
If this is not deemed acceptable due to the perceived urgency of funding the grants, I can entertain a small singular depletion (like the one of the competition, but smaller) that manages to fund the first grants until the gov fund is back on its feet with significant enough funds to fund these types of things by itself.

[Highlander]

I appreciate a lot the conversation going on. So far, i struggle to set my position and i probably would abstain.

I do want the MOST protocol growth we can achieve in this unfair crypto space, and i totally trust our current team both in their intentions and decisions.
Furthermore, i’m all for trying new things, that’s how you can actually find good and bad solutions and then you can double down on the efficient ones and experience real growth. We need to use new marketing tools and techniques (viral content on CT, gamification, degen contests, pro marketing firms, a few strategic/smart/efficient KOLs partnerships, etc etc), even if i’m a bit dubious regarding grants overall as a growth tool: either builders are gifted and will spontaneously use gTrade because of its diamond contracts / easy architecture to build on / possibilities, no need to be convinced and they’ll be happy to have a revenues share out of it. Or they don’t have a great will or a great product and will just farm our grants like company farm national subsidies. Farming subsidies is a real sport IRL, and it’s even worse in crypto. For example, i’m unsure Arbitrum grants specifically helped that much their protocol growth, if even a little, though i can see how selecting a few promising projects and teams and give them grants to build on us can be a clever move. On this point, my vision on this is too simplist i reckon, and that’s where i choose to trust the team vs my own limited opinions.

With all that said, from my small experience i come from another project where they were totally free to use protocol $ as they wanted, and they mispent a crazy ton of money in useless partnerships (this was mainly due to follow their own personal agenda, which i’m very confident won’t happen with our current team of course, + safeguards there would be like grant limits etc).

But teams members composition always evolve over time, people leave and are replaced, and as Midget say we can have a “give a mouse a cookie effect” or “this is our new normal”, especially for new team members to come in the future.

Overall, so far i’m not sure i’ve enough fine comprehension on the whole thing to vote FOR or AGAINST a Recurrent (that’s the main word here) grant system. Hence my leaning towards abstention. But i will obviously read this very interesting conversation until the end to fine tune my advice. Thanks for everything, team and community. You’re all the best.

[kaptaincrypto]

Thanks for the detailed proposal Joseph. I understand the goal of accelerating integrations, but for me the incentive of “price might go up if we integrate” doesn’t feel like a strong enough reason to use OC — which is ultimately token holder capital.

If we’re talking about deploying token holder funds, I’d prefer to see clearer mechanisms where holders themselves share directly in the upside (e.g. allocations or structured distributions), not just the hope that integrations translate into price appreciation.

Until then, I don’t feel comfortable supporting this use of the OC.